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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the potential cost savings for the 
Marine Corps by replacing the current SRB program with one 
that uses the format of a Sequential Self-Selection Auction 
Mechanism (S3AM).  The power of predicting behavior based 
upon opportunity costs is the theoretical underpinning of 
the Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM).  The 
S3AM greatly reduces the payment of economic rent.  The 
payment of economic rent is limited because the Marine Corps 
would only pay Marines a monetary sum that more closely 
corresponds to their active duty opportunity cost.  In other 
words, the S3AM would allow the Marine Corps to capture more 
of the economic surplus, making the SRB process 
substantially more cost effective.   
If a S3AM were used in lieu of the current SRB program, 
the Marine Corps would potentially save money while still 
meeting endstrength requirements.  For example, using the 
S3AM in FY 2006 would have potentially saved the Marine 
Corps $12,123,885, $690,471 and $118,390, respectively, for 
the three Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) analyzed, 
based on a four year multiple.  This savings would have been 
realized, if the two and six year S3AM model were used to 
pay FY 2006 bonuses to the 0311s, 0621s and 5811s that 
reenlisted.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) are an 
influential tool that United States Marine Corps manpower 
planners use to appropriately shape the force, while 
simultaneously ensuring that endstrength requirements are 
met.  The principal purpose of SRBs is to attract  
well-qualified service members and persuade them to reenlist 
for a specified period of time.  Offering a financial 
incentive enables the Marine Corps to meet its enlisted 
endstrength goals, while rewarding each eligible Marine with 
premium compensation.  However, SRBs can be costly and money 
only comes in finite quantities.  As with other fiscal 
funding, the capital that supports the Marine Corps’ SRB 
program must be appropriated through the United States 
Congress on an annual basis.   
The Global War on Terrorism has significantly 
heightened the costs associated with the SRB program.  As a 
result, the Marine Corps’ authorized endstrength has been 
notably increased.  This endstrength increase obviously 
incurs a greater cost that must be appropriated and paid to 
qualified Marines.  Major Jerry R. Morgan, the U.S. Marine 
Corps’ Enlisted Career Force Planner, has said: “The Marine 
Corps has almost doubled its SRB cost in just one year, 
spent approximately $53M in FY05, but will spend 




B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to evaluate whether the current SRB 
program can be replaced by a Sequential Self-Selecting  
Auction Mechanism (S3AM)2 for improved effectiveness and 
cost savings.  Ultimately, this thesis will ascertain which 
option would generate the most cost savings to the Marine 
Corps.   
1. Primary Question 
Most specifically, the primary objective of this thesis 
is to explore the potential cost savings for the Marine 
Corps by replacing the current SRB program with one that 
uses the format of the S3AM.  The methodology relies heavily 
on previous research reported in scholarly articles and 
journals, as well as the construction of cost curves to 
estimate the potential savings to the Marine Corps.   
2. Secondary Question 
Second, this thesis will determine the feasibility of 
substituting the S3AM in lieu of the current SRB program.   
C. PAY AND THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER 
FORCE 
A cursory look at the military pay system and the 
efficiency of the all-volunteer force is useful because it 
illustrates a Department of Defense policy that is more cost 
effective, than the Marine Corps’ current SRB program.  Pay 
is one of the many notable differences between the Armed 
Forces and civilian companies.  It is also one topic that 
seems to garner significant media attention and scrutiny.  
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Members of the Armed Forces are paid according to their 
current rank and their time within their respective service.   
Thus, a service member’s pay is calculated from a rigid and 
inflexible pay chart.  However, there is a clear incentive 
for promotion which boosts short-term pay and long-term 
retirement pay.   
The Department of Defense’s pay chart does not allow 
leaders to reward the deserving, but does allow them to 
punish the wayward through loss of rank.  As Cymrot and 
Mayberry observe, the system lacks flexibility: 
The only targeted flexibility within the system 
comes through special pays, such as Aviation 
Continuation Pay or Selective Reenlistment 
Bonuses.  Under the military pay, personnel have 
little control over their own financial 
circumstances.3 
Special pays are very rarely adjusted for inflation and 
are still well below comparable civilian bonuses.  Secondly, 
the salaries that are paid to service members must be 
appropriated through the Congressional budgetary process.  
Civilian companies are not required to submit budget 
proposals through the House of Representatives, nor are they 
required to strictly adhere to a Department of Defense pay 
chart.  The pay outlays for the Armed Forces are immense and 
come from public tax dollars, which also does not occur 
within civilian corporations.  For example, in 2001, 
President Bush “proposed a $5.7 billion increase in the 
amount to be spent on compensation and benefits.”4   
The expense of maintaining the all-volunteer force has 
not abated and now “costs twice as much to maintain a person 
in uniform in the all-volunteer force than it did during the 
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days of conscription.”5  Even though the costs of 
maintaining the all-volunteer force have steadily increased, 
the overall cost to society has decreased.  For instance, 
the personnel cost of the Armed Forces as a percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1975 was two percent; in 
2000 it was less than one percent of GDP.6   
Additionally, from an economic standpoint, the all-
volunteer force is more efficient “due to the fact that the 
opportunity costs of the personnel comprising a volunteer 
force will always be less than or equal to the opportunity 
costs of the personnel serving in a mixed force of equal 
size.”7  However, there are exceptions, such as involuntary 
service.  Involuntary service is less efficient because 
society bears more of the burden and pays more of the cost.  
This occurs because those who were involuntarily called into 
service typically had higher opportunity costs than those 
who volunteered.  Society must then pay the difference in 
opportunity costs.  Clearly, the all-volunteer force 
benefits both society and the military.  Society experiences 
less of a deadweight loss and is consequently more 
economically efficient; at the same time, an all-volunteer 
system provides the Armed Forces with motivated enlistees 
and officers.  
The all-volunteer force continues to perform admirably 
and has done remarkably well during recent and continuing 
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The patriotic 
fervor that occurred after September 11, 2001 has abated, 
but the services are still able to attract the quantity and 
quality of enlistees and officers that their respective 
labor pools demand, with the obvious exception of the Army.  
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Additionally, people are staying in the services longer and 
are coming in slightly older than they were 30 years ago.8  
John Warner and Beth Asch, in their article “The Record and 
Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United 
States,” have written: 
In other words, the average recruit today has 
stayed about two years longer than did the 
average recruit during conscription.  The average 
age of the enlisted force has risen from 25 years 
to 27.5 years.  Between 1974 and 1987, 
“careerists,” personnel with more than four years 
of experience rose from 39 percent to 50 percent 
of the enlisted force.9 
As the force has aged and become more experienced, it 
has also become more productive and efficient, particularly 
with respect to occupational specialties.  However, as the 
force has aged, many service members are getting married at 
younger ages when compared with their civilian counterparts.  
As Charles Moskos has observed “married junior enlisted 
personnel have become an accepted reality, a trend with 
major budgetary implications with regard to housing and 
medical care.”10   
Additionally, recent combat operations have required 
excessive deployments for many service members.  These 
deployments have required them to part from their families 
on numerous occasions.  Because of these frequent and long 
separations, some service members have begun to opt out of 
the military, to seek the security and solace of stable 
civilian employment.  In this respect, the security of a 
non-deployable civilian job becomes the more favorable 
option.  A new civilian career may also offer more choice 
regarding salary, location, position, schooling, community, 
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and so on.  As evidenced from the aforementioned paragraphs, 
the all-volunteer force portrays to the reader a cost 
effective DOD policy, which serves as a useful guide in 
helping to transform the Marine Corps’ SRB program. 
D. CURRENT SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS POLICY 
The Marine Corps Order on SRBs describes the program in 
the following way: 
The SRB program was established to assist in 
attaining and sustaining adequate numbers of 
career enlisted personnel in designated Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS’s) and within 
particular years-of-service groupings. The 
program provides a monetary incentive for a 
reenlistment of at least 4 years at three career 
decision points during the first 14 years of 
service. Marine Corps Bulletin 7220 series, 
published separately and revised as required to 
meet the needs of the Marine Corps, identify 
MOS’s eligible for a SRB and their multiples. The 
intent of this program is that Marines who 
receive a bonus for reenlistment in a particular 
skill serve the entire period of reenlistment in 
that skill.11 
Typically the Marine Corps Bulletin, which is referred 
to in the aforementioned paragraph, is published annually.  
The Marine Corps Bulletin lists the jobs (MOSs) that are 
eligible for SRBs and the multiples in which they will be 
paid for meeting the specified criteria and formally 
agreeing to remain in service for a particular length of 
time.  Additionally, the bulletin lists the MOSs that will 
be paid an SRB in each particular zone.  The three zones 
available for reenlistment are: Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C.  
Zone A reenlistments are for Marines who have served on 
active duty for a period between 21 months and six years.12  
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Zone B reenlistments are for Marines who have served on 
active duty for a period of six to ten years.13  Zone C 
reenlistments are for Marines who have served on active duty 
for a period of 10 to 14 years.14  The reenlistment zones 
are a subset to the Marine Corps’ First-Term Alignment Plan 
(FTAP) and the Subsequent-Term Alignment Plan (STAP).  
According to Major Jerry R. Morgan, the FTAP accomplishes 
the following:  
¾ Identifies the number of first term eligible 
Marines, by Primary MOS (PMOS), who are needed to 
meet endstrength requirements.15 
¾ Reenlistment allocations are based on endstrength 
requirements and projected inventory surpluses.16 
¾ “Prevents promotion stagnation.”17 
¾ “Fills undermanned MOSs through the lateral move 
program.”18 
The primary purpose of the STAP “is to move Career 
Force inventory levels toward Career Force requirements when 
an imbalance is present.”19  The Career Force consists of 
Marines who have served their initial enlistment and who 
have reenlisted for a second time.  This process is highly 
competitive; indeed, “over the past six years, the 
reenlistment opportunity for the Corps has been around 
25%.”20  According to Major Jerry R. Morgan, the STAP is 
designed to achieve the following: 
¾ Retains Marines to meet the endstrength 
requirements of the Career Force.21 
¾ “Complements the FTAP by reducing first-term 
reenlistment requirements.”22 
¾ Identifies short MOSs that must be filled in order 
to meet endstrength requirements of the Career 
Force.23 
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The money to be paid out as an SRB is computed in the 
following manner: 
The bonus amount is computed by multiplying: (1) 
The Marine’s monthly basic pay at the time of 
discharge or release from active duty; (2) Times 
the number of years, and/or fraction of years 
(months) of additional service for which the 
Marine will be obligated beyond existing 
obligated service; (3) Times the SRB Program 
multiple, not to exceed 10, for the applicable 
MOS as designated in the current Marine Corps 
Bulletin 7220 series.24 
The total SRB amount that is paid to an eligible Marine 
may not exceed $90,000 and that Marine must reenlist for a 
period of three or more years.25  Ultimately, the FTAP 
“plans for the future”26 and the STAP balances out the 
Career Force endstrength requirements using SRB payments.  
Although the SRB payments are not cost effective due to the 
payment of economic rents; the SRB program adequately 
ensures that enlisted endstrength requirements are met. 
E. SUMMARY 
Analyses of pay and the all-volunteer force are 
important because they illustrate a cost effective 
Department of Defense policy.  The Sequential Self-Selecting 
Auction Mechanism (S3AM) would limit the payment of economic 
rent.  Economic rent would be limited, because the Marine 
Corps would pay Marines a monetary sum that corresponded 
more closely to their opportunity cost of remaining on 
active duty.  In other words, the S3AM would allow the 
Marine Corps to capture more of the economic surplus, making 
the SRB process more cost effective.  
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Ultimately, if a S3AM were used in lieu of the current SRB 
program, the Marine Corps would save money and still meet 
endstrength requirements. 
Consider that Marines who are eligible for the SRB 
program roughly fall into the following three categories: 
1. Marines who would be willing to reenlist for only 
a fraction of the SRB amount, or none at all. 
2. Marines who would be willing to reenlist for the 
exact SRB amount. 
3. Marines who would be willing to reenlist, but only 
for an amount which is higher than the SRB being 
offered.  
Marines who have been assigned to the MOSs that qualify 
for an SRB, and who then reenlist, will almost exclusively 
come from category 1 above; therefore they receive economic 
rents.  A Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM) 
would limit the payment of economic rent, because the Marine 
Corps would provide Marines a monetary sum that coincides 
more closely with their willingness to accept a 
reenlistment, or which more closely reflects their 
willingness to stay.  In other words, the S3AM would allow 
the Marine Corps to capture more of the surplus, making the 
SRB process more cost effective.  Ultimately, if a S3AM were 
used in lieu of the current SRB program, the Marine Corps 
could save a substantial amount of money and still have a 
high caliber of reenlistees. 
F. THESIS CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be arranged into five chapters. 
Chapter I, the introduction, will provide background 
information to the reader and delineate the structure of the 
thesis.  Chapter II will cover topics such as: the four 
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types of auctions, the basics of auction theory, asymmetric 
information, and signaling.  Chapter III, the literature 
review, will discuss a variety of published works that are 
pertinent in building the case for an overhaul of the Marine 
Corps’ current SRB policy.  Chapter IV will discuss the 
theoretical approach toward the implementation of the S3AM 
for the Marine Corps’ SRB program.  Additionally, chapter IV 
will present graphic depictions of the potential cost 
savings that may be generated through the implementation of 
the S3AM.  Lastly, Chapter V will present the summary, 




II. AUCTIONS, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AND SIGNALING 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Auctions are not new, nor are they unique.  They have 
been used in the marketplace for thousands of years to sell 
items such as fine wine, stamps, art, produce, and countless 
other items.  This chapter serves two purposes.  The first 
purpose is to summarize the basic types of auctions.  The 
second purpose is to discuss the importance of signaling and 
asymmetric information in auctions. 
B. THE BASIC AUCTIONS 
1. The English Auction 
The English auction has been used for centuries.  It 
has been used by “Sotheby’s since 1744 and Christie’s since 
1766,” to sell items such as fine art, furniture, clothes 
worn by former First Ladies, and many other unique items.27  
eBay has become the modern purveyor of English auctions and 
has turned this auction type into a lucrative business.  For 
instance, eBay averages 750,000 daily transactions, which 
amount to the daily exchange of $30 million.28  Campbell has 
succinctly described the English auction as:  
The bidders interact directly with each other, in 
stages.  Someone makes an initial bid, and anyone 
can raise it.  This process continues until no 
one is willing to raise the bid.  The asset goes 
to the last bidder at a price equal to his or her 
bid.29 
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An English auction typically uses an oral/outcry format, 
such as that used by Sotheby’s and Christie’s.  
2. The Dutch Auction 
Dutch auctions are often used to sell agriculture 
items, such as roses.  Additionally, a Dutch auction may 
also be referred to as a descending bid auction, because the 
product ask price steadily declines over time.  A Dutch 
auction “is the converse of an English auction.”30  Milgrom 
has described the Dutch auction as: “the auctioneer/seller 
begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price 
until some bidder shouts “Mine” to claim the item.”31  Some 
Dutch auctions have visible timers and bid displays that 
record the current time and the current bid.  As the auction 
progresses, the ask price descends until a bidder has gone 
at or below their reservation value, which is dependant upon 
the number of bidders and the distribution of their bids.  
Subsequently, the bidder will submit or announce a bid that 
is at or below their reservation price, which stops the 
clock and awards the product to the highest bidder.  
3. The First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction 
First price auctions may be used for items such as: 
mineral rights, government contracts, artwork and real 
estate.32  Many people refer to this type of auction as a 
“silent auction,” because bids are submitted in writing and 
there is no auctioneer calling out prices and bids.  
Typically, most first-price sealed-bid auctions only allow 
bidders to submit one bid per product.  The product is then  
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awarded to the individual with the highest sealed-bid.  
McAfee and McMillan, describe the first-price sealed-bid 
auction in the following way: 
With the first-price sealed-bid auction, 
potential buyers submit sealed bids and the 
highest bidder is awarded the item for the price 
he bid.  The basic difference between the first-
price sealed-bid auction and the English auction 
is that, with the English auction, bidders are 
able to observe their rival’s bids and 
accordingly, if they choose revise their own 
bids; with the sealed-bid auction, each bidder 
can submit only one bid.33 
The first-price sealed-bid auction hinders individuals 
from gathering information about the bidding behavior of 
others, in striking contrast to the English auction.  The 
English auction facilitates the observation of other 
bidders, which enables individual bidders to reformulate 
their bids, based upon their new reservation value for the 
product.  The optimal bidding strategy in a first-price 
sealed-bid auction is for an individual to bid some 
increment below his true reservation price for the object, 
with the size of this increment depending upon the number of 
bidders and the estimated distribution of reservation 
values.  The bid represents a tradeoff between maximizing 
the probability of winning the item (lower bid) and 
capturing surplus value if successful (higher bid).   
4. The Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction 
The second-price sealed-bid auction is commonly 
referred to as the “Vickrey auction,” due to William 
Vickrey’s epic work in second-price auctions.  Essentially, 
the second-price sealed-bid auction works identically to the 
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first-price sealed-bid auction, with one monumental 
exception.  In the second-price sealed-bid auction, the 
bidder with the highest bid wins the product, but will pay a 
price equal to the second highest (or first excluded) bid.  
Campbell describes the second-price sealed-bid auction in 
the following manner: 
Each individual submits one bid, usually without 
knowing what anyone else has bid.  The asset is 
awarded to the high bidder at a price equal to 
the second highest bid.34   
The second-price sealed-bid auction is unique because it 
“induces truthful revelation of an individual’s reservation 
value.”35  Unlike the first-price sealed-bid auction, 
bidders in a second-price sealed-bid auction should submit a 
bid exactly equal to their true reservation value.  Figure 1 
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Figure 1.   Auction Types and Their Characteristics36 
 
5. Forward Auctions and Reverse Auctions 
A forward auction occurs when there is one seller and 
multiple buyers.  A reverse auction occurs when there is one 
buyer and multiple sellers.  In the case of this thesis, the 
S3AM is a reverse auction because the Marine Corps functions 
as a single buyer, buying multiple reenlistments contracts 
from several Marines interested in selling their employment 












Auction = Exchange Mechanism
 
Figure 2.   Forward and Reverse Auction37 
 
C. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION  
Information asymmetry occurs when one party has more 
information than another party, which may give them an 
advantage over the other.  Specifically, information 
asymmetry is “a difference in access to relevant 
knowledge.”38  There are two distinct problems that may 
occur when information asymmetry is present: moral hazard 
and adverse selection.39   
The moral hazard problem stems from the typical 
principal/agent relationship, an example of this may be 
found in the labor market.  In the typical labor market, the 
employer acts as the principal and the employee acts as the  
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agent.  The moral hazard occurs when workers may be tempted 
to shirk their duties because the employer is not closely 
observing their behavior.40  
Adverse selection occurs when one party is privy to 
more information than another party, such as in the market 
for used cars.  Mankiw, in his book, “The Principles of 
Economics,” defines adverse selection as: “the tendency for 
the mix of unobserved attributes to become undesirable from 
the standpoint of the uninformed party.”41  For example, if 
an individual were shopping for a used car and the used car 
had significant engine problems, unbeknownst to the buyer; 
the average consumer would deem this transaction as 
“undesirable.”  
A classic example of self selection is the market for 
company health insurance policies.  For example, Company X 
offers two health insurance polices: a premium policy and a 
traditional policy.  The premium policy requires the 
employee to pay a high premium, which ensures that the 
employee will receive more health benefits and additional 
health packages, such as a prescription plan.  The 
traditional plan is low cost and low benefit without any of 
the additional health packages.  The self selection occurs 
when relatively sick people, or those with more of a medical 
need, choose the premium plan, and those with less of a need 
choose the traditional plan.  
D. SIGNALING  
Signaling is the “action taken by an informed party to 
reveal private information to an uninformed party.”42     
For example, the Marine Corps motto, “First to Fight,” sends 
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two different signals.  One, it informs the citizens of the 
United States that the Marine Corps is always one of the 
first branches of the Armed Forces to be sent into battle.  
Secondly, it reminds the Marines that they must always be 
prepared for combat and rapid deployment.   
Two items must be present to create an effective 
signal: the signal must be costly for the producer and the 
signal should be beneficial to the consumer of a high 
quality product.43  For instance, Sears advertises that 
their Craftsmen tools are guaranteed for a lifetime, with 
some minor stipulations.  If the tool breaks, the consumer 
may return the broken item to Sears for a replacement.  
Sears has sent a signal to consumers, implying that their 
tools will last forever.  This is an effective signal for 
two reasons.  One, Sears has convinced the consumer that 
they have purchased a high quality product.  Two, Sears 
incurs the costs of advertisement and the replacement costs 
for broken tools.  
The growing market for college degrees offers the 
following two unique insights: education may be viewed as a 
tool that signals an individual’s ability or may be viewed 
as a productivity enhancing experience.  Proponents of the 
human capital theory believe that college educated 
individuals are more productive than their non-college 
educated counterparts, and are therefore paid a wage 
premium.   
However, other economic theorists believe college 
graduates signal that they have more ability than a non-
college graduate.  This occurs for three reasons: 
individuals who attend college self-select into schools 
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based upon their intellectual ability; college is difficult 
and therefore signals to others the commitment level of that 
individual; and college is easier for those who are smarter.  
Employers view this as a signal because “an action is being 
taken not for its intrinsic benefit but because the 
willingness to take that action conveys private information 
to someone observing it.”44    
The previous discussions of asymmetrical information 
and signaling are vitally important to auction theory.  
These concepts are important because when moral hazard and 
adverse selection occur, “the market may fail to put 
resources to their best use.”45  Auctions are a useful 
market tool for two reasons.  First, when holding all other 
things constant, auctions allocate goods according to an 
individual’s reservation value.  Secondly, auctions force 
individuals to make cost effective decisions based upon 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents published, scholarly articles 
that focus on the following two areas: auction theory 
principles and key assumptions, and the presentation of 
empirical data from experimental auction studies.  
Specifically, this chapter will be divided into two main 
parts.  The first half of the chapter will present auction 
theory literature that specifically addresses the 
theoretical applications behind auctions and their 
affiliated theories/assumptions.  The second half of the 
chapter will present the published results of empirical 
studies that have been previously conducted.  The empirical 
studies will furnish the reader with explicit examples of 
producer surplus, which may be directly correlated to the 
use of auction mechanisms.  Finally, as many of the articles 
share mutual auction theory concepts, only the unique 
aspects of each article will be presented in this chapter.  
B. AUCTION THEORY 
1. William Vickrey 
In 1996, William Vickrey was awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Economics: “William Vickrey's research has concerned the 
properties of different types of auctions, and how they can 
best be designed so as to generate economic efficiency.”46 
William Vickrey’s seminal work entitled, 
“Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed 
Tenders,” is a treasure trove of auction theory information.  
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Furthermore, Vickrey’s article provides fundamental 
conclusions that support the purpose of this thesis and lend 
weight to the arguments.   
Vickrey begins his article by addressing the “exclusive 
public marketing agency.”  In this section, Vickrey states, 
“an exclusive public marketing agency to which all sales of 
this commodity must be made and from which all supplies of 
the commodity must be bought.”47  In other words, the 
producer is a monopolistic firm.  In the context of this 
thesis, the Marine Corps may be viewed as a monopolist 
because no one else may replicate their product or their 
core competencies (more accurately, the Marine Corps is a 
“monopolist” or the only buyer in the market for Marine 
reenlistees).  Additionally, Vickrey emphasizes that, “in 
order to determine the optimum pattern of transactions” the 
producer must plot their marginal cost curves and determine 
the utility function of the consumers, or plot their 
marginal value curves.48   
When describing bidders in the Dutch auction, Vickrey 
has said the following: 
The knowledge that each bidder has about the 
motives and probable behavior of the others can 
be derived from a set of probability 
distributions from which the value of the object 
to each of the bidders is conceived to be drawn.  
For simplicity, we shall assume that all bidders 
have the same conception of the probability 
distribution from which any given player is 
deemed to derive the value he places on the 
object; the given player, of course, knows the 
actual value he places on the object but is 
assumed also to know the distribution from which 
others consider his value to be drawn.49 
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For instance, “if players conform to this norm” Marines that 
desire to reenlist will reveal their true willingness to 
accept a reenlistment.50  In a specific application, Marines 
will portray to others the monetary value that they place on 
continued service, within the Marine Corps, by providing 
their reservation value.  Marines will then fall into two 
categories: Marines with a high opportunity cost and Marines 
with a low opportunity cost.  Marines that have a high 
opportunity cost, or more opportunities for a better paying 
civilian job, will bid high, and it will require more money 
to retain these individuals.  Marines that have a lower 
opportunity cost, or those who have less opportunity for a 
better paying civilian job, will bid low, and it will 
require less money to retain these persons.  Ultimately, the 
measurement of opportunity costs, via the Sequential Self-
Selecting Auction Mechanism (S3AM), enables Marine SRB 
planners to appropriately gauge the SRB to be paid. 
The hallmark of Vickrey’s work is the concept of a 
sealed-bid second-price auction.  Vickrey describes the 
sealed-bid second-price auction in the following way: 
It is easily shown that the required procedure to 
ask for bids on the understanding that the award 
will be made to the highest bidder, but on the 
basis of the price set by the second highest 
bidder.  If this procedure is carried out, then 
the optimal strategy for each bidder (assuming, 
as is indeed necessary in the analysis of the 
progressive auction itself, the absence of 
collusion among bidders) will obviously be to 
make his bid equal to the full value of the 
article or contract to himself…51  
Once again, Vickrey emphasizes the importance of an 
individual submitting a bid that reflects their true value 
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for the item, which becomes their reservation value.  
Specific to this thesis, a Marine that faces the decision to 
reenlist, must decide upon two key items: what is their 
opportunity cost, and how much do they value a continuation 
of their active duty service.  The combination of these 
factors will then determine the individual’s ultimate 
reservation value.  Once these two questions are answered, 
in a second-price reenlistment auction, the Marine should 
submit a sealed-bid that accurately reflects his or her 
reservation value for continued service. 
2. Paul Milgrom 
Paul Milgrom’s article, “Auctions and Bidding: A 
Primer,” addresses many of the same points that Vickrey has 
made in his article regarding the optimal strategy for 
auctions.  Additionally, Milgrom expands upon additional 
auction theory concepts, such as: the independence 
assumption, the private values assumption, the Nash 
equilibrium, the revenue equivalence theorem, and optimal 
bidder strategies.  The proceeding paragraphs will explore 
each in turn.   
Milgrom defines the independence and private values 
assumption as the following: “the independence assumption 
means that there is no unobserved common factor affecting 
all of the competitor’s bids while the private values 
assumption allows the contractor to ignore the competitor’s 
information in forming its cost estimate.”52  The 
independence assumption allows bidders to make 
“statistically independent” bids that may be predicated on 
historical bidding patterns, and the private values 
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assumption is based upon personal opportunity costs.53  
These concepts are significant for accurate planning 
purposes.  In particular, it is reasonable for SRB planners 
to assume that Marine opportunity costs reflect independent 
private values (or costs) for continued active duty service. 
In other words, one Marine’s willingness to reenlist (the 
minimum bonus he would need to receive to reenlist) is a 
function of his own personal and professional circumstances 
and is unrelated to the willingness to reenlist of other 
Marines.  
Nash equilibrium is a solution concept named after the 
Nobel Laureate John Nash.  The premise of the Nash 
equilibrium concludes that market participants will choose 
their optimal strategy based upon the expected strategy of 
the other market participants.  Milgrom in his discussion of 
the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auction has said: 
That is, the sets of strategies are identical and 
the outcome rules that transform strategies into 
allocations are identical. Since solution 
concepts like the Nash equilibrium work on 
strategic forms, these concepts predict 
powerfully that the identity of the winner and 
the price the winner pays will always be the same 
for these two kinds of auctions.54 
The Nash equilibrium solidifies the argument that a Dutch 
auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction are 
strategically equivalent.  
 Milgrom makes mention of the revenue equivalence 
theorem in order to prove that the variety of auctions all 
yield the same expected revenue.  Specifically, Milgrom has 
said: 
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The English and sealed bid auctions yield exactly 
the same expected profit for every bidder 
valuation and the same expected revenue for the 
seller.  Indeed, every auction that allocates the 
goods efficiently and offers no profit to a zero 
valuation bidder has the same expected profits 
for every bidder valuation and the same expected 
revenue for the seller.55 
The main premise from the previously mentioned quote is that 
auctions allocate goods efficiently.  However, as will be 
pointed out later, by both Milgrom and the empirical 
evidence provided in this chapter, the S3AM will allow the 
bid-taker to capture more of the surplus than under a simple 
single auction format. 
 Because the S3AM employs a generalization of the 
second-price auction, if the Marine Corps were to adopt the 
S3AM in lieu of the current SRB program, the optimal 
strategy for Marines competing for reenlistments would be 
for them to submit a sealed-bid that accurately reflects 
their value of the reenlistment.  In other words, a Marine 
who is eligible for reenlistment must determine their 
opportunity cost for remaining in the Marine Corps and 
determine their reservation value.  When describing the 
optimal individual strategy, Milgrom has said: 
From the perspective of an individual bidder, the 
price he names merely specifies the lowest price 
at which he will be willing to undertake 
production.  So it is a dominant strategy for 
each bidder to name a price equal to his marginal 
cost c; that way he accepts all offers to produce 
output at a price exceeding his cost per unit, 
and no other offers.56 
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Simply stated, a Marine that faces the reenlistment 
decision, under the S3AM based SRB program must do two 
things:  
¾ Create an individual cost benefit analysis that 
accounts for remaining within the active duty 
Marine Corps (opportunity cost).   
¾ Submit a sealed-bid that accurately reflects their 
value of continued active service, their 
reservation value.  
3. McAfee and McMillan 
Preston McAfee and John McMillan in their article, 
“Auctions and Bidding,” have discussed the basic auction 
theory model and the revelation principle.  These two 
significant concepts will be discussed in the proceeding 
paragraphs.  McAfee and McMillan define the basic auction 
model, which they refer to as the “benchmark model,” with 
the following assumptions: 
A1. The bidders are risk neutral. 
A2. The independent-private-values assumption 
applies. 
A3. The bidders are symmetric. 
A4. Payment is a function of bids alone.57 
McAfee and McMillan’s benchmark model was used to analyze 
the four basic types of auctions, each of these auctions 
were discussed in Chapter II.  The authors were able to 
conclude that “each of these auction forms yields on average 
the same revenue to the seller.”58  They were able to make 
this conclusion based upon the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. 
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McAfee and McMillan describe the Revelation Principle 
as, “a tool used” to determine the optimal auction for the 
seller.59  The authors describe an optimal auction by: “the 
seller asking the bidders how much they value the item and 
the bidders responding by honestly reporting their 
valuations to the seller.”60  In the case of the Marine 
Corps’ using the proposed S3AM for SRBs, a Marine that has a 
high opportunity cost for remaining within the active duty 
Marine Corps would bid high for a reenlistment bonus.  This 
is the case because a Marine with a high opportunity cost 
would earn higher wages in the civilian marketplace and 
these wages would be lost if the Marine were to remain on 
active duty.  A Marine with a low opportunity cost would bid 
low for a reenlistment bonus for two reasons: one, the 
Marine is motivated not only by pay, but also through the 
utility of serving.  The second reason is that, in the 
private sector, the Marine would be earning wages equal to 
or less than they were earning now. 
C. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM AUCTIONS  
1. David Lucking-Reiley 
David Lucking-Reiley in his article “Using Field 
Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: 
Magic on the Internet,” talks about how he used different 
auction types to sell Magic trading cards on the internet, 




For this study, I purchased over $2,000 of Magic 
cards and resold them via auctions in the 
Internet marketplace.  The basic procedure was to 
auction two copies of the same card via two 
different auction mechanisms, to make direct 
comparisons of the revenue earned in each one.61 
The two types of auctions that Lucking-Reiley used were the 
Dutch and first-price auctions.62  The first day of trading 
on the internet, yielded 15% more revenue with the Dutch 
auction, than it did for the first-price auction.63  
Additionally, the author has provided summary statistics for 
total sales in several tables throughout his study.   
 Table 1 under the first column, lists the mean log 
difference for the Dutch auction as .293.64  The mean log 
difference is important, because it allows you to make the 
following conclusion: when holding all things constant, the 
Dutch auction on average will yield 29.3% more revenue than 

















As Lucking-Reiley has said: 
These field experiments provide, for the first 
time, evidence from real-world auctions that 
allow revenue comparisons between the four basic 
auction formats.  They indicate that Dutch 
auction revenues exceed first-price auction 
revenues, and English auction revenues are not 
significantly higher than second-price auction 
revenues.66 
2. van den Berg, van Ours, and Pradhan 
Gerard J. van den Berg, Jan C. van Ours, and Menno P. 
Pradhan, in their article, “The Declining Price Anomaly in 
Dutch Rose Auctions,” examined data from the Aalsmeer Flower  
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Auction (AFA) to analyze price movements from sequential 
auctions.67  The authors have described their study, as the 
following: 
In contrast, our data concern sequential auctions 
in which auctioned lots consist of many units and 
each lot is fully homogenous.  Our results 
therefore provide additional insight into the 
nature of the declining-price phenomenon.68   
This study warrants a closer look because the proposed S3AM 
for the Marine Corps’ SRBs, also auctions off homogenous 
items, reenlistments, in a sequential manner.  Furthermore, 
this study again illustrates that an appropriately designed 
auction allows the producer to capture more of the surplus. 
 The authors created a pricing model and then ran a 
fixed effect regression.  The t-statistic from their fixed 
effect regression clearly portrays a decline in prices.  
Specifically, the average t-statistic, for all of the 
modeled transactions is −2.4.69  This allows you to conclude 
that when holding all other things constant; on average, the 
prices that were paid for the roses declined 2.4% for all of 
the 7,058 observed transactions.70    
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
“Auctions have been used for more than 2500 years to 
allocate a single indivisible asset.”71  When properly 
constructed, auctions become a formidable tool that a 
producer may wield.  If a producer chooses to transact with 
consumers, through a properly structured auction mechanism, 
they afford themselves the opportunity to capture more of 
the economic surplus.  In the case of this thesis, the S3AM 
will save the Marine Corps money.  The Marine Corps is able 
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to save money, because the S3AM enables the Marine Corps to 
capture more of the economic surplus.  The exact amount of 
economic surplus will be presented in Chapter IV.  
Furthermore, the S3AM will provide a flexible force shaping 
tool to the Marine Corps’ SRB planners. 
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IV. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE SEQUENTIAL 
SELF-SELECTION AUCTION MECHANISM (S3AM)  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter illustrates the significant potential cost 
savings that could be generated through using the S3AM, in 
lieu of the Marine Corps’ current SRB program.  Furthermore, 
this chapter will furnish the reader with S3AM examples from 
three Marine Corps Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), 
with two types of annual contracts, a short-term and a long-
term.  The following four mixes of contracts will be 
examined: a two year/four year combination, a two year/six 
year combination, a three/six year combination, and a four 
year/six year combination.  
In order to meet FTAP endstrength requirements, each of 
the MOSs mentioned in this chapter were paid bonuses during 
fiscal year (FY) 2006.  In other words, the samples 
presented were drawn from the Marine Corps’ FY 2006 Zone A 
population.  The sample MOSs consisted of: 0311 (Infantry 
Rifleman), 0621 (Field Radio Operator), and 5811 (Military 
Policeman). 
B. S3AM OVERVIEW 
1. Conceptual Framework of the S3AM  
The S3AM is based upon sequential sealed-bid second-
price auctions and is designed to allow individuals to self-
select into two categories; these categories may be derived 
from a Marine’s retention signals which are based upon their 
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willingness to accept a reenlistment.72  These two retention   
categories consist of: those relatively more willing to 
reenlist for a long-term contract, and those relatively more 
willing (or at least equally willing) to reenlist for a 
short-term contract.73  Conceptually, this separation occurs 
because Marines with a low opportunity cost or a high 
penchant for active duty service would be willing to accept 
a long-term contract with a lower bonus to secure their 
future military employment.  Marines with a high opportunity 
cost, on the other hand, would require a higher bonus to 
reenlist and consequently self-select into a shorter-term 
reenlistment, which provides a higher bonus.   
The construct of the S3AM must contain the following 
items and adhere to the following guidelines: 
¾ For each MOS, conduct two sequential sealed-bid 
second-price auctions for reenlistments that have 
a short-term commitment (first auction) and a 
long-term commitment (second auction), such as 
three year and a six year contracts.74 
¾ In each auction, eligible Marines within that MOS 
will submit a bid representing the minimum bonus 
amount that they would be willing to accept in 
return for reenlistment for the specified number 
of years. 
¾ Because each auction is a reverse auction, the 
winning bidders will be those who submit the 
lowest bids (or reenlistment bonus amounts). 
¾ “Participation would constitute a binding 
commitment,”75 for any bidder who submits a 
winning bid.  If a bidder submits a winning bid 
for both the short-term and long-term auction, 
that Marine would receive the long-term 
reenlistment bonus and be subject to the long-term 
reenlistment term.  Note that, in such a case, the 
long-term contract would be the Marine’s preferred 
contracts as indicated by their bids.76 
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¾ The cutoff amount, or the bonus paid to all 
Marines under each contract term, would be the 
first excluded bid for each of the auctions (i.e. 
the lowest bid among the “losers” of the auction).  
The S3AM provides endstrength planners flexibility 
in meeting manpower requirements.  For example, 
the bonus cutoffs could coincide with an increase 
or decrease of personnel requirements within the 
Enlisted Career Force, which increases or 
decreases the reenlistment percentages.  
Additionally, endstrength planners could seek to 
maximize the number of reenlistments which adhered 
to budgetary constraints.77 
¾ Cost savings from use of the S3AM are maximized 
when there is an element of uncertainty about 
future reenlistment opportunities for Marines who 
accept short-term contracts, which is best 
expressed as a probability.  For example, Marines 
who are reenlisted under a short-term contract may 
face the possibility that future budgetary 
constraints or endstrength requirements (in 
particular MOSs or across-the-board) may limit the 
number of Marines who are offered reenlistment 
bonuses at the end of the short-term contract.  
The element of uncertainty induces more 
individuals to accept the long-term contract 
(especially among those Marines most interested in 
securing their long-term employment in the Marine 
Corps), because of the certainty of employment and 
the security that is inherent with a steady 
income.  Consequently, the Marine Corps is able to 
capture more of the surplus.   
¾ The fact that truthful revelation is the optimal 
bidding strategy in the first auction is valuable 
for the following two reasons.  First, when a 
Marine reveals their true reservation value for a 
reenlistment, this allows the SRB planner to 
confirm the relevance of the opportunity costs for 
each of the respective MOSs.  Secondly, the second 
auction would allow SRB planners to estimate the 
risk aversion levels of the bidders, based upon 
their bidding behavior.  
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2. The S3AM Practical Application 
In practice, application of the S3AM would proceed in 
the following five stages: 
1. All Marines that are eligible for a reenlistment 
contract for that particular MOS, submit bids for 
the short-term contract that are indicative of 
their willingness to accept a reenlistment for the 
short-term contract (i.e. their bid indicates the 
minimum bonus they would be willing to accept to 
reenlist). 
2. The SRB planners only accept the percentage of 
winning bids that would allow them to meet 
endstrength requirements.  For example, if there 
were 3,000 1371s that were eligible for 
reenlistment and the FTAP quota required 15% of 
the eligible Marines, then the Marines who 
submitted the 450 lowest bids would be selected 
for reenlistment; no other Marines in this 
occupational field would be offered reenlistment. 
3. The SRB planners determine the first excluded bid 
for the short-term auction, which becomes the SRB 
that would be paid to each of the Marines under 
the short-term contract.  In other words, all 
reenlisted Marines who end-up reenlisting under 
the short-term contract are paid the same 
reenlistment bonus.  Note that the bonus that each 
Marine is paid will be higher than his or her 
submitted bid for the short-term auction.78 
4. The 450 Marines who submitted the lowest bids in 
the first auction would then submit bids 
indicating what they would need to be paid to 
reenlist for a guaranteed long-term contract, 
based on the short-term bonus for which they were 
already approved. 
5. The Enlisted Endstrength Planners will determine 
the appropriate mix of short-term and long-term 
contracts based on budgetary constraints, force-
shaping needs and other appropriate factors.  The 
corresponding numbers of Marines with the lowest 
bids for the long-term contracts, are then given 
the long-term reenlistment.  The first excluded  
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bid from the long-term contract becomes the long-
term reenlistment bonus based upon the remaining 
FTAP quota.  
3. The Optimal S3AM Strategy for the First Auction 
Because the auction is a second-price auction, the 
optimal strategy in the first auction is for Marines to 
truthfully reveal their reservation value for a short-term 
reenlistment.  In other words, how much money will it take 
to keep a Marine on active duty and within his or her 
current MOS.  Truthful revelation is important because 
Marines self-select into one of two categories: Marines who 
want to continue to remain on active duty and Marines that 
do not.  When weighing this decision, a Marine with a high 
opportunity cost requires a larger bonus to stay; a Marine 
with a low opportunity cost requires a smaller bonus to 
stay.   
4. The Optimal S3AM Strategy for the Second Auction 
The second round auction is also a second-price 
auction, so the dominant strategy is again to truthfully 
reveal the minimum bonus that you would be willing to accept 
in order to reenlist for a long-term contract.  Note that 
the minimum amount a Marine would be willing to accept for a 
long-term reenlistment depends on: (1) his or her 
opportunity cost of remaining in the Marine Corps,(2) the 
amount of the short-term bonus (which he or she is already 
guaranteed), (3) the relative length of the short-term vs. 
long-term contracts, and (4) that particular Marine’s 
perceived probability that he or she would be offered  
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reenlistment for another short-term contract (with a similar 
short-term bonus) after completion of the initial short-term 
reenlistment contract. 
Consequently, the optimal amount for any Marine to bid 
in the auction for the long-term reenlistment contract can 
be derived from an economic break-even point formula between 
a certain long-term contract and short-term contract with 
uncertainty concerning follow-on short-term reenlistment 
bonuses.  Assuming a risk-neutral bidder, the break-even 
point is given by the following formula: 
L = S(1-pM)/M(1-p)+C[1-(1- pM)/M(1-p)]79 
The variables in this break-even formula represent the 
following values:  
¾ L = the break-even value for the long-term bonus 
(i.e.,the Marine’s optimal bid) 
¾ S = short-term contract bonus as determined in 
the first auction 
¾ P = the particular Marine’s perceived probability 
that he or she would be offered reenlistment for 
another short-term contract (with a similar short-
term bonus) after completion of the initial short-
term reenlistment contract 
¾ M = the multiple between the short-term and long-
term contracts (i.e. the ratio between the number 
of years under the long-term contract to the 
number of years under the short-term contract) 
¾ C = the particular Marine’s opportunity costs of 
remaining on active duty in the Marine Corps. 
In the case of this thesis, the opportunity costs may 
be derived from the logistic regressions derived from two 
separate Center for Naval Analyses studies (CNA).80  These 
studies sought to predict the percentage of enlisted 
Marines that would reenlist, within a certain MOS, when the 
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Marines were offered an SRB.  The first study, by James H. 
North, entitled “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective 
Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” was 
published in 1994.  The second study, by Anita U. 
Hattiangadi et al., entitled, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Lump Sum Bonuses for Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C 
Reenlistments: Final Report,” was published in 2004.  Table 
8 from the North study and Table 6 from the Hattiangadi 
study help generate the opportunity cost curves for each 
MOS, at the five SRB multiple levels.81  The graph depicted 
in Figure 3, shows the shape of the opportunity cost curves 
for FY06 0311s, 0621s, and 5811s. 






























5. Key Points and Assumptions 
To estimate the potential cost savings that the Marine 
Corps could garner by implementing the S3AM, certain 
assumptions were made in the analysis, which include the 
following:   
¾ Each Marine perceives that, if he reenlists for a 
short-term contract now, there is a 60% 
probability that he will be offered another 
short-term reenlistment contract at the end of 
that initial contract.  If the actual probability 
is lower than 60%, the Marine Corps would capture 
a greater potential cost savings because of the 
uncertainty associated with a short-term 
commitment decision.  
¾ 70% of the end of active service (EAS) population 
is eligible for reenlistment.  The figure of 70% 
was employed to bias downward the potential 
savings that the S3AM would generate and thus 
provide a conservative estimate.  This prudent 
action was undertaken to avoid overstating the 
vast savings that could be created if the S3AM 
were implemented, and to add some realism into the 
theoretical S3AM model calculations.   
¾ The EAS population numbers were derived from the 
data contained within the Marine Corps’ 7220 
Bulletin series, entitled, “FTAP Mission Marine 
Administrative Message,” number 476/05, which was 
dated on October 14, 2005.83   
¾ The Marine Corps will continue to pay bonuses as 
lump sums vice annual installments. 
¾ The opportunity costs used reflect FY 2006 data, 
which were obtained from the Marine Corps’ SRB 
planner. 
¾ The S3AM bonus cost for each of the MOSs examined 
is purposely overstated.  The S3AM cost is higher 
because the model was run using the numbers for 
the FTAP quota vice the numbers of Marines who 
were actually paid an SRB.  For instance, in FY 
2006 the FTAP quota for 0311s was 504 Marines, but 
only 482 Marines were paid an SRB; as a result, 
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the S3AM bonus cost calculated below is slightly 
higher that it would actually have been if it were 
implemented and used during FY 2006.84 
Consequently, the potential savings from employing 
the S3AM is again a conservative understatement.  
¾ The opportunity costs employed were calculated 
assuming a Corporal/E4 with four years time in 
service and a four year service commitment.  The 
pay data originated from the 2006 pay table. 
The S3AM spreadsheet allows you to derive the short-
term and long-term bonus amounts that should be paid to each 
MOS.  The bonus amounts paid out to the Marines are based 
upon their opportunity costs and these opportunity costs are 
derived from the CNA’s logistic regression.  Specifically, 
as the CNA stated in their 2004 study, “each spring, CNA 
uses the model to forecast reenlistment responses by 
occfield to SRBs from level 0 (no SRB) to level 5.”85  As a 
result, the CNA is able to produce an occupational field 
(occfld) specific table that predicts Zone A reenlistment 
percentages with SRB bonus multiples that range from zero to 











Table 2.   FY 2006 Zone A Reenlistment Percentages86 
 
  
Once the applicable occupational field opportunity 
costs are incorporated into the spreadsheet, the next step 
is to determine the FTAP quota and the eligible MOS 
reenlistment population size.  These numbers are entered 
into the spreadsheet and then the break-even opportunity 
cost is calculated using the formula mentioned previously.  
Once this break-even value is computed, the spreadsheet will 
calculate the number of short-term and long-term contracts 
and their respective bonus amounts.  The division between 
short and long-term contracts can reflect budgetary or force 
shaping consideration, or other relevant factors.  In this 
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analysis, the mix of short-term and long-term contracts was 
chosen to minimize the total bonus cost over the length of 
the short-term contract for that occupational field.  When 
holding all other things constant, the number of Marines 
that would theoretically commit to a short-term and long-
term contract will equal the desired FTAP quota.  Specific 
examples for the MOSs of 0311, 0621, and 5811 will be 
covered in the subsequent sections of this chapter.  
C. POTENTIAL 0311 ZONE A REENLISTMENT COST SAVINGS 
1. Two and Four Year Contracts 
The FY06 0311 E5, E4, and E3 EAS population size was 
approximately 3,500 Marines.87  Of those Marines, 70% are 
assumed to be eligible for reenlistment, which yields a 
corrected population size of 2,450 Marines; 482 Marines were 
actually paid an SRB, and the FTAP quota was 504 Marines.88  
The FY06 0311 Zone A bonus multiple was 4; the total actual 
SRB paid was $13,709,225; and the average SRB per Marine was 
$28,442.89  When holding all other things constant, the S3AM 
model produces the following results:  
Table 3.   0311 Two and Four Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 179 $1,006.00 
Long-term Contract 325 $810.00 
Total S3AM Cost 504 $443,261.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 482 $3,427,306.00 
Potential Savings 504 $2,984,046.00 
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The lump sum potential savings may be calculated as: 
¾ Total annual S3AM cost = (the number of short-term 
contracts * short-term annual bonus amount) + (the 
number of long-term contracts * long-term annual 
bonus amount). 
¾ S3AM potential savings = (actual annual FY06 SRB 
cost) – (S3AM total annual cost).   
2. Two and Six Year Contracts 
When applying the S3AM to the selection between two and 
six year contracts, the Marine population parameters and the 
numbers of short-term and long-term contracts have remained 
the same as above.  However, the long-term contract bonus 
paid to 325 Marines has changed.  This change has occurred 
because Marines that favor a longer commitment have a lower 
break-even value because of the added risk associated with 
the larger time difference between the short and long-term 
contracts.  Table 4 annotates the changes and the potential 
savings. 
 
Table 4.   0311 Two and Six Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 179 $1,006.00 
Long-term Contract 325 $665.00 
Total S3AM Cost 504 $393,335.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 482 $3,427,306.00 
Potential Savings 504 $3,030,971.00 
 
 45
3. Three and Six Year Contracts 
The three year and six year contracts yield the exact 
same results as the two and four year contracts because the 
short and long-term contracts have the same multiple of two, 
in both cases (i.e. because 4/2 = 6/3 = 2).  Therefore, the 
three and six year contracts will not be addressed here for 
the 0311 MOS, nor for either the 0621 or the 5811 MOSs. 
However, it should be understood that the potential annual 
savings are the same as for the two year and four year 
contract combination.  
4. Four and Six Year Contracts 
Four and six year contracts share the same population 
parameters, as mentioned above, but there is a change in the 
potential overall savings and the bonuses paid to Marines. 
Table 5 illustrates the annual cost conversion for the 
short-term and long-term contracts and the specific 
potential savings. 
 
Table 5.   0311 Four and Six Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 179 $1,006.00 
Long-term Contract 325 $900.00 
Total S3AM Cost 504 $472,718.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 482 $3,427,306.00 
Potential Savings 504 $2,954,588.00 
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D. POTENTIAL 0621 ZONE A REENLISTMENT COST SAVINGS 
1. Two and Four Year Contracts 
The FY06 0621 E5, E4, and E3 EAS population size was 
approximately 943 Marines with a corrected population size 
of 660 eligible Marines.90 The FY 2006 FTAP quota required a 
reenlistment of 246 Marines, however only 200 Marines 
actually executed the FTAP and all 200 were paid an SRB.91  
The FY06 0621 Zone A bonus multiple was 1.5; the total 
actual SRB paid was $2,292,916; and the average SRB was 
$11,464.92  When holding all other things equal, the S3AM 
model has produced the following results:  
 
Table 6.   0621 Two and Four Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 120 $1,969.00 
Long-term Contract 126 $1,585.00 
Total S3AM Cost 246 $436,078.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 200 $573,229.00 
Potential Savings 246 $137,151.00 
 
The lump sum potential savings may be calculated as: 
¾ Total annual S3AM cost = (the number of short-term 
contracts * short-term annual bonus amount) + (the 
number of long-term contracts * long-term annual 
bonus amount). 
¾ S3AM potential savings = (actual annual FY06 SRB 
cost) – (S3AM total annual cost).   
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2. Two and Six Year Contracts 
The two and six year contracts stipulate that the same 
short-term bonus be paid, but reduces the amount of the 
long-term bonus.   
 
Table 7.   0621 Two and Six Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 120 $1,969.00 
Long-term Contract 126 $1,304.00 
Total S3AM Cost 246 $400,611.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 200 $573,229.00 
Potential Savings 246 $172,618.00 
 
3. Four and Six Year Contracts 
The four and six year contracts reduce the potential 
savings because Marines that accept a long-term contract 










Table 8.   0621 Four and Six Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 120 $1,969.00 
Long-term Contract 126 $1,762.00 
Total S3AM Cost 246 $458,343.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 200 $573,229.00 
Potential Savings 246 $114,886.00 
 
E. POTENTIAL 5811 ZONE A REENLISTMENT COST SAVINGS 
1. Two and Four Year Contracts 
The FY 2006 5811 E5, E4, and E3 EAS population size was 
approximately 559 Marines with a corrected population size 
of 391 eligible Marines.93 The FY 2006 FTAP quota required a 
reenlistment of 120 Marines.  The FY06 5811 Zone A bonus 
multiple was 1; the total actual SRB paid was $694,461; and 
the average SRB was $7,310.94  However, only 95 Marines were 
actually paid an SRB.95  Therefore, the potential savings  
produced by the S3AM is understated.  The potential savings 
are deflated, because the S3AM bonus cost was calculated 
based upon the FTAP quota which required 120 Marines.  When 
holding all other things equal, the S3AM model has produced 




Table 9.   5811 Two and Four Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 52 $1,487.00 
Long-term Contract 68 $1,195.00 
Total S3AM Cost 120 $158,565.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 95 $173,615.00 
Potential Savings 120 $15,050.00 
  
The lump sum potential savings may be calculated as: 
¾ Total annual S3AM cost = (the number of short-term 
contracts * short-term annual bonus amount) + (the 
number of long-term annual contracts * long-term 
bonus amount). 
¾ S3AM potential savings = (actual annual FY06 SRB 
cost) – (S3AM total annual cost).   
2. Two and Six Year Contracts 
Table 10.   5811 Two and Six Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 52 $1,487.00 
Long-term Contract 68 $981.00 
Total S3AM Cost 120 $144,018.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 95 $173,615.00 
Potential Savings 120 $29,598.00 
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As table 10 illustrates, Marines that desire the 
security of a six year contract are paid a lower bonus.  
Subsequently, the lower long-term bonus increases the 
overall savings that the Marine Corps could potentially 
capture.  
3. Four and Six Year Contracts 
The 5811 population parameters remain the same for the 
four and six year contracts, but there is a change in the 
potential overall savings and the bonuses paid to Marines. 
Table 11 illustrates the annual cost conversion for the 
short-term and long-term contracts and the specific 
potential savings. 
 
Table 11.   5811 Four and Six Year Contracts with Four Year 
Annual Conversion 
 
 Number of Marines S3AM Annual Bonus 
Short-term Contract 52 $1,487.00 
Long-term Contract 68 $1,329.00 
Total S3AM Cost 120 $167,697.00 
Actual FY06 SRB 95 $173,615.00 
Potential Savings 120 $5,918.00 
  
F. COMBINED TOTAL SAVINGS 
Table 12 and Figures 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the 
potential combined savings that the Marine Corps would have 
incurred if the S3AM were used in FY06.  Please note that 
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the table and bar charts depicted in this section are 
calculated over a four year period and are not annual 
amounts.  For the S3AM two and six year options, these 
comparisons use the four year equivalent payment based on 
the annual bonus calculated above.  Current Marine Corps 
policy stipulates that Marines reenlist for a period of 
three or more years, therefore the SRB multiples have been 
calculated as: (Marine’s monthly base pay * SRB multiple *  
four year contract length).  The combined savings in Table 
12 reflect the reduction in the Marine Corps’ traditional 
four-year lump-sum payment. 
 
 
Table 12.   Potential Combined Savings Over a Four Year   
Horizon  
 
  Combined 
Savings 
  
Contract/MOS 0311 0621 5811 Total 
2/4 Year $11,936,183 $548,603 $60,200 $12,544,986
2/6 Year $12,123,885 $690,471 $118,390 $12,932,746
4/6 Year $11,818,354 $459,546 $23,672 $12,301,572
2/6 Year96 $12,391,201 $1,480,660 $467,416 $14,339,277
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Figure 4.   FY06 0311, 0621, 5811 Combined Potential Savings 






























Figure 5.   FY06 0311, 0621, 5811 Combined Potential Savings 
for a 2&6 Year Contract 
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Figure 6.   FY06 0311, 0621, 5811 Combined Potential Savings 
for a 4&6 Year Contract 
 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The S3AM model could potentially save the Marine Corps 
millions of dollars annually, while simultaneously ensuring 
that endstrength requirements are being met, by an eligible 
pool of Marines.  Furthermore, the S3AM provides endstrength 
planners with a dynamic force shaping tool that continues to 
evolve with time and never becomes outdated.  This occurs, 
because opportunity costs are the fuel that power the S3AM 
and the benchmark by which the SRB multiples are set.  
Additionally, Marines that have high opportunity costs still 
receive a monetary incentive for a reenlistment.  
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The S3AM model affords endstrength planners the ability 
to make more cost effective decisions based on multiple 
contract options.  On average, the two and six year 
contracts yield the largest potential savings, but a two 
year contract would require approval from the United States 
Congress.97  Specifically, the two and six year contract 
option for 0311s, 0621s, and 5811s would have potentially 
saved the Marine Corps $12,123,885, $690,471, and $118,390, 
respectively, in FY 2006, based on a four year multiple.  
The potential cost savings for each set of short-term and 
long-term contracts has its advantages, some produce more 
potential savings and others may be more palatable for 
prospective reenlistees to accept.  When holding all other 
things constant, every set of multiple contract options that 
were presented, theoretically produced a robust cost 
savings.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSION 
1. Primary Research Question Answered 
The power of predicting behavior based upon opportunity 
costs is the theoretical underpinning of the Sequential 
Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM).  The S3AM greatly 
reduces the payment of economic rent.  The payment of 
economic rent is limited because the Marine Corps would only 
pay reenlisting Marines a monetary sum that more closely 
corresponds to their active duty opportunity cost.  In other 
words, the S3AM  would allow the Marine Corps to capture 
more of the economic surplus, making the SRB process 
substantially more cost effective.   
If the S3AM were used in lieu of the current SRB 
program, the Marine Corps would potentially save tremendous 
amounts of money while still meeting endstrength 
requirements.  For example, the S3AM would have potentially 
saved the Marine Corps $12,932,746 in FY 2006 for just three 
occupational fields, over a four year time period.  This 
savings would have been realized if the two and six year 
S3AM model were used to pay FY 2006 bonuses to the 0311s, 
0621s, and 5811s that reenlisted.   
2. Secondary Research Question Answered 
The S3AM model allows endstrength planners to tailor 
contract options based upon the needs of the force.  On 
average, the two and six year contracts yield the largest 
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potential savings, but a two year contract would require 
approval from the United States Congress.  The Congress 
would be willing to make a legislative change if the S3AM 
successfully met the following two conditions: will the S3AM  
save the Federal government money and is the S3AM something 
that could be replicated across the services.  Clearly, the 
S3AM has the potential to save large sums of money, as 
evidenced from the previous chapter.  Secondly, the S3AM is 
also something that could be implemented by the Department 
of Defense and passed on to the other services.   
However, there are two other available options, which 
do not require Congressional approval.  The two other 
options available to endstrength planners are: the three and 
six year contract option and the four and six year contract 
option.  As illustrated in chapter IV, both of these 
contract options still yield potential savings.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The theoretical applications of the S3AM present 
substantial potential savings to the Marine Corps.  However, 
theories must be proven and to be proven they must be 
rigorously tested.  To adequately test the S3AM, several 
iterations of economic experiments must be undertaken.  The 
Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language Institute 
provide a pool of both officers and enlisted service members 
that could be used for the requisite experiments.   
These economic experiments must be done for two 
reasons.  The first reason is to determine if a service 
member’s bidding behavior is indicative of their true 
opportunity costs, or if there are other factors that exert 
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a significant influence on bidding behavior.  The second 
reason is to determine the risk behavior of the bidders.  
Answers produced from these experiments will reveal how the 
S3AM model could be constructed to yield the largest 
producer savings while still ensuring that eligible Marines 
are paid a cost effective bonus.  Additionally, the crucial 
consumers of Marine Corps reenlistment are the Marines 
themselves and their families.  Survey research should be 
conducted to determine what set of short-term and long-term 
contracts would solicit the most favorable responses. 
Market participants respond to incentives and the 
Marine Corps’ market for reenlistments is not atypical, 
therefore the implementation of sound economic polices would 
stand the test of time.  The S3AM provides endstrength 
planners with a uniquely flexible force shaping tool that 
awards deserving Marines a bonus, but does so in a more cost 
effective manner.  Furthermore, the use of the S3AM would 
generate multimillion dollar cost savings that would benefit 
the Marines, their families, the Marine Corps and the 
American tax payer. 
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